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Uniform Commercial Code: Article 2A-Leases:
Structuring Priorities of Competing Claimants
to Leased Property
Despite the tremendous growth of personal property leas-
ing in the United States,' the statutory and case law related to
leasing has failed to provide a comprehensive and consistent
framework for dealing with the legal issues arising within the
leasing context.2 Commentators and practicing lawyers have
urged some form of uniform statutory treatment of personal
property leasing.3 In response to this perceived need to codify
leasing law, Article 2A, entitled "Leases," recently was promul-
gated as an amendment to the Uniform Commercial Code
1. The leasing industry has expanded significantly since the 1950s. See
R. CONTINO, LEGAL AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF EQUIPMENT LEASING TRANS.
ACTIONS 17 (1979). "Since 1978, leasing has grown more than twice as fast as
business investment in equipment." INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, 1987 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 53-1 (1987) [hereinafter OUTLOOK].
The expansion coincided with the need of companies with little capital to ac-
quire expensive equipment. See R. CONTINO, supra, at 34. This need, com-
bined with favorable tax treatment for lessors, spawned a variety of leasing
alternatives. See OUTLOOK, supra, at 53-2 ("It was estimated that 60 percent of
all lease activity in 1984 was tax-motivated."); inkfra note 26 (discussing various
categories of professional lessors). Despite the recent decline of tax advan-
tages to lessors, predictions are that the leasing industry will continue to ex-
pand. See OUTLOOK, supra, at 53-3.
2. Legal issues involving true leases have been analyzed under bailment,
contract, real estate, landlord-tenant law, and the Uniform Commercial Code.
See Reisman & Mooney, Drafting, Negotiating, and Construing the Equipment
Lease-An Overview, in EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING 37-40 (B.
Fritch & A. Reisman 2d ed. 1980). Various federal and state statutes regulate
specific aspects of personal property leasing. E.g., Consumer Leasing Act of
1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667e (consumer leases); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3308 (West
1970) (damages for lessee's breach); see also Mooney, Personal Property Leas-
ing: A Challenge, 36 Bus. LAw. 1605, 1607-09 (1981) (discussing the legal
framework of personal property leasing in the U.S.); Willenzik, Personal Prop-
erty Leases in Louisiana, 44 LA. L. REV. 755 (1984) (discussing confusion sur-
rounding law related to personal property leasing in Louisiana).
3. See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 2, at 1605. Options considered include:
amending the Uniform Commercial Code to bring personal property leasing
within the scope of Articles 2 and 9, creating a distinct Uniform Personal
Property Leasing Act (UPPLA), and creating a new U.C.C. article to address
personal property leases. See id at 1621-29; see also Boss, Panacea or
Nightmare? Leases in Article 2, 64 B.U.L. REv. 39 (1983) (exploring argu-
ments for and against amending Article 2 to include leases and concluding that
separate article addressing leasing is better alternative).
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(U.C.C.). 4
Article 2A has been approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the
American Law Institute (ALI).5 The proposed statute recently
has been presented for enactment to the legislatures of several
states.6 If adopted, the statute will affect many common com-
mercial transactions that create a "true" lease of personal prop-
erty. In a true lease transaction, the lessee obtains the right to
use property owned by the lessor for a period of time in ex-
change for rent.7
4. U.C.C. § 2A-101 comment. All citations and references to Article 2A
of the U.C.C. are to 1A U.L.A. (Supp. 1988). Unless otherwise indicated, all
citations and references to the U.C.C., other than to Article 2A, are to the 1978
Official Text and Comment.
5. Mooney, Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code Annual Sur-
vey, 42 Bus. LAW. 1209, 1210 (1978).
6. Oklahoma has adopted Article 2A. 1988 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 86
(West). It has been presented for enactment in California, Connecticut, Illi-
nois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Washington. UCCArti-
cle 2A-Leases Moving in Calif , Am. A. Equipment Lessors News Bull., Nov.
1987, at 8, col. 1.
7. Much litigation and commentary have questioned whether a transac-
tion labeled a "lease" is a true lease rather than either a conditional sale or a
lease intended as a security interest. See, e.g., DeKoven, Proceedings After De-
fault by the Lessee Under a True Lease of Equipment, in 1C P. COOGAN, W.
HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J. MCDONNELL, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 29B.03-04 (1988) (discussing distinctions between a
true lease, a security lease, and a sale of goods); Reisman & Mooney, supra
note 2, at 15-29 (reviewing approaches courts have used to determine whether
a lease is actually a disguised security interest); Leary, Leasing and Other
Techniques of Financing Equipment Under the U..CC, 42 TEMP. L.Q. 217
(1969) (examining "shibboleths" courts use to distinguish true lease from
"lease intended as security" in borderline cases).
Courts have distinguished between leases and security agreements in or-
der to determine whether specific transactions are subject to Article 9 of the
U.C.C. See, e.g., Towe Farms, Inc. v. Central Iowa Prod. Credit Ass'n, 528 F.
Supp. 500, 503-04 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (finding transaction to be true lease and
thus not subject to Article 9). The U.C.C. excludes leases from its definition of
security interest:
Unless a lease.., is intended as security, reservation of title thereun-
der is not a "security interest" .... Whether a lease is intended as
security is to be determined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the
inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease
one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance
with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option
to become the owner of the property for no additional consideration
or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended for
security.
U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
Article 2A also distinguishes a true lease from other transactions. "[A]
sale, including a sale on approval or a sale or return, or retention or creation
of a security interest is not a lease." U.C.C. § 2A-103(j). The U.C.C. Article 2A
1988]
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This Note focuses on Part 3 of Article 2A, "Effect of Lease
Contract," which governs conflicting claims to leased personal
property.8 Part I of this Note describes the leasing industry
and the role of leasing in commercial financing. Part II dis-
cusses conflicts arising when a lessor or lessee exposes the
other party's interest to third-party claims and reviews the
common-law treatment of competing claims to leased goods.
Part III focuses on the application of the priority provisions of
part 3 of Article 2A and the policy choices underlying those
provisions. Finally, Part IV suggests amendments to further
the objectives of the statute.
I. THE LEASE TRANSACTION
Long-term leasing has become a popular alternative to the
installment purchase 9 and chattel mortgage,' 0 two forms of se-
cured transactions," as a means of financing the acquisition of
equipment. 2 A secured transaction is one in which a creditor
Committee also drafted a suggested revision of the definition of security inter-
est for inclusion in U.C.C. § 1-201(37). See 1 U.L.A. 23-24 (Supp. 1988). The
effort attempted to draw a clearer line between a true lease and a disguised
security interest. U.C.C. § 2A-101 comment.
A comprehensive treatment of whether a transaction is a true lease or a
security interest is beyond the scope of this Note. For purposes of discussion,
this Note will assume a true lease transaction unless otherwise noted.
8. Part 3 covers third-party rights as well as priority disputes between
creditors and the lessee or lessor. Given the expanding role of personal prop-
erty leasing in our economy, a system of ordering the relative priorities of the
various parties asserting claims against the property is crucial.
9. In an installment purchase, or conditional sale, the buyer acquires
ownership of the equipment by making an initial down payment and signing a
contract to pay the balance in installments over a period of time. The seller
takes a security interest in the equipment to secure payment of the unpaid bal-
ance. The installment purchase is embodied in the Code's purchase-money se-
curity interest and is governed by Article 9. U.C.C. §§ 9-107, 9-102.
10. The chattel mortgage is a device that allows a lender (mortgagee) to
take a security interest in personal property to secure repayment of a loan.
The chattel mortgage is an example of a traditional security device governed
by Article 9. U.C.C. § 9-102.
11. U.C.C. § 9-102(2). Article 9 substitutes the term "security interest" for
the various common-law and statutory terms used to denote forms of secured
financing. U.C.C. § 9-101 comment. "Security interest" applies to any interest
in personal property that secures payment of an obligation. U.C.C. § 9-201(37).
12. This Note focuses on long-term leasing of equipment. "Equipment" is
a category of goods used or bought primarily for use in business. U.C.C. § 9-
109. In a long-term lease, the lessee acquires use of equipment for a substan-
tial portion of its life. In contrast, a short-term lease may range from a few
hours to several months. A party requiring use of expensive equipment for
only a short time probably would not consider purchasing, because it would be
cheaper to lease than to purchase outright. A party expecting to use equip-
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contractually obtains an interest in personal property owned by
a debtor to secure repayment of the debt.' 3 Leasing differs
from a secured transaction in that a lessor, the party analogous
to a creditor in a secured transaction, retains ownership of the
leased property.14 A lessee, similar to the debtor, acquires pos-
session of needed equipment, but the lessee has no interest in
the property once the lease terminates. 15 For the lessor, own-
ership of equipment affords certain benefits. Unlike the credi-
tor, the lessor can take advantage of tax benefits such as
depreciation and applicable tax credits.16 In addition, once the
ment for a number of years, however, might consider an installment purchase
or mortgage loan as opposed to a lease transaction. See Coogan, The ABC's of
Leasing and the UCC, in 1 P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J. McDoNNELL,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4.1.02
(1988) [hereinafter ABCs].
13. The secured creditor's security interest is something less than a gen-
eral ownership claim to the property. See generally Coogan, The Intelligent
Lawyer's Guide to Secured Transactions After More Than Three Decades
Under the Code, in I P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J. McDoNNELL, SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2-1 (1988). An
enforceable security interest gives the secured creditor a right to take the spe-
cific property collateral and to apply any proceeds from its disposition to the
debt if the debtor defaults (as defined by the security agreement) on the loan.
U.C.C. § 9-503.
14. The touchstone of a true lease is the retention of both a meaningful
residual interest in the leased property and any accompanying economic risks
of ownership at the end of the lease term. Reisman & Mooney, supra note 2,
at 27.
Although the lessor retains ownership of the equipment, most lease agree-
ments stipulate that the lessee assume all the costs normally associated with
ownership. These costs include maintenance, insurance, taxes, and other inci-
dental expenses arising during the term of the lease. See id. at 30.
15. Under the lease contract, the lessee acquires only the right to possess
and use the property for a period of time. See McDonald's Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Johnson, 176 Ind. App. 399, 402, 376 N.E.2d 106, 109 (1978) (noting "[a] bail-
ment involves no transfer of ownership; the bailee acquires only a possessory
interest continuing for the period of bailment"); Towe Farms, Inc. v. Central
Iowa Prod. Credit Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 500, 505 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (finding that
"true lease is not a transaction of purchase and does not confer even voidable
title upon the lessee"); Shosid v. Hughes Tool Co., 258 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1953) (holding that title does not pass to lessee in bailor-bailee rela-
tionship).
In most modern lease transactions the lessor has no independent use for
the equipment. See Hawkland, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code
on Equipment Leasing, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 446, 449 [hereinafter Hawkland, Im-
pact] ("The lessor usually never sees the item and has no desire ever to own it
in the sense of having the use of it."). Consequently, although the lessor re-
gains possession of the equipment at the end of the lease, the lessor typically
will offer to sell or lease it to the lessee at its fair market value. See Reisman
& Mooney, supra note 2, at 30.
16. For a discussion of the specific tax advantages obtained through leas-
1988]
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lessor regains possession of equipment at the termination of the
lease, the lessor is free to re-lease or to sell the equipment for
additional profit.'7
Whether leasing is more desirable than secured financing
depends on a variety of factors. For example, a potential lessee
may need to conserve working capital' 8 or wish to reduce the
risk of equipment obsolescence.19 A lessor can expect certain
ing, see Macan, Tax Aspects of Equipment Leasing, in EQUIPMENT LEASING-
LEVERAGED LEASING 377 (B. Fritch & A. Reisman 2d ed. 1980).
17. In a true lease, the lessor is entitled to all proceeds upon disposition of
the equipment. See Reisman & Mooney, supra note 2, at 37-38. In a secured
transaction, however, the creditor must remit any surplus over the secured
debt to the debtor/owner. U.C.C. § 9-504(2).
18. From the lessee's standpoint, a major advantage of leasing over other
forms of financing is that a lease generally requires no down payment. The
sophisticated lessee may acquire the use of income-producing equipment, cover
the lease payments out of pre-tax income generated by use of the equipment,
and generate a margin of profit with no capital investment. Thus, leasing al-
lows companies to retain existing cash reserves or lines of bank credit for
other uses. See R. CONTINO, supra note 1, at 33-34.
Tax considerations also may make leasing attractive to the lessee. If the
lessee is unable to make effective use of ownership tax advantages, the lessee
may benefit financially by taking the rent deduction. I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (1987);
see Macan, supra note 16, at 377-81 (discussing tax issues in leasing).
Other nontax-based incentives to the lessee include: the ability to main-
tain debt capacity by excluding lease payments in calculating present debt
(although sophisticated lenders ask debtors to disclose such contingent liabili-
ties and to certify the extent of these obligations); the ability to include main-
tenance and servicing in the lease contract at favorable rates; and the ability to
design a contract that allocates rights and obligations advantageously between
parties (nonetheless, the lessee should consider the costs of constructing a
lease contract). See INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A COM-
PETITiVE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. EQuIPmENT LEASING INDusTRY 12-20 (1985)
(discussing types of leased equipment, corresponding finance advantages, and
industry pitfalls); OuTLOOK, supra note 1, at 53-2.
19. Highly technical equipment, such as a computer, may become obsolete
before the end of its useful life. Through leasing, the lessee may be able to
negotiate a provision for upgrading equipment as technology improves. The
lessor, however, likely will build in a substantial premium to compensate for
assuming this risk. See R. CONTINO, supra note 1, at 32-33.
Various risks are associated with acquiring untested equipment. The
lessee may prefer leasing to avoid the risk of purchasing equipment that may
not perform as predicted. Predicting the residual value of the equipment at
the end of the lease term presents another risk. If the lessee can negotiate
favorable rental payments based on the lessor's expectation of a large residual
value, the lessee may avoid the risk of acquiring a "lemon." For other advan-
tages to the lessee, see supra note 18.
Leasing also presents certain disadvantages to the lessee. The major dis-
advantage is that the lessee does not acquire an ownership interest in the
equipment even though rental payments may equal or exceed the full
purchase price. At the end of the lease term, the lessee must return the equip-
ment and has no claim to any residual value. See R. CONTINO, supra note 1, at
[Vol. 73:208
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advantages over a secured creditor when competing claims to
the equipment arise from creditors of, or transferees from, the
lessee.20 When a lessee declares bankruptcy, for instance, a les-
sor's right to reclaim equipment is protected against claims of
the lessee's creditors or trustees without filing a financing
statement, while a secured creditor's right may be defeated if
the security interest is not perfected by filing.21
Notwithstanding differences between leasing and secured
transactions, long-term leasing closely resembles secured fi-
nancing.22 A consensual agreement governs each by defining
the rights and obligations of the contracting parties.23 In addi-
tion, each transaction typically involves three parties. Parties
to a leasing transaction include a lessee, an equipment supplier,
and a lessor.24 In many instances, the lessor, like the creditor,
36-37. In considering whether to lease or purchase, the potential lessee must
weigh these and other economic factors as well as the comparative rights and
risks of leasing and ownership. For an interesting hypothetical describing the
lease/sale dilemma, see Coogan, Is There A Difference Between a Long-term
Lease and an Installment Sale of Personal Property?, in 1 P. COOGAN, W. HO-
GAN, D. VAGTS & J. MCDONNEL, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 4AA.01 (1988) [hereinafter Coogan, Difference].
20. See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
21. See Hawkland, Impact, supra note 15, at 456. The usual method of
perfecting a security interest is to file a financing statement. For the general
rule and specific exemptions see U.C.C. § 9-302.
22. For a comparison, see generally Coogan, Difference, supra note 19.
23. The lessor and lessee seek to protect their interests in the leased prop-
erty, to assign risk, and to provide for remedies in the event of default. De-
fault occurs when either party fails to perform a duty specified in the lease
agreement or imposed by law.
A typical lease agreement resembles a security agreement, except for the
lessee/lessor terminology.
Many of the lease provisions can almost be lifted verbatim from a se-
curity agreement... e.g., (a) the lessor receives back substantially all
its investment, and, in some cases, its profit over the fixed term of the
lease; (b) the lessee is obligated to pay all charges and expenses in
connection with the lease and the equipment; (c) the lessor makes no
warranties of any kind, so that the lessee is for all intents and pur-
poses an insurer of the equipment and is obligated to continue to
make payments despite destruction or loss from any cause; (d) upon
default all rentals are accelerated; and (e) the lessee is liable for attor-
neys' fees.
Reisman & Mooney, supra note 2, at 31-32.
24. See, e.g., id. at 30 (noting responsibilities of each party to the transac-
tion). This type of transaction is commonly referred to as a finance lease. Id.
at 29. When a leasing company or lease broker is involved, a fourth party is
added to the user-seller-financing agency group. See Leary, supra note 7, at
224. Short-term leasing typically involves only the owner-lessor and the
lessee. See Mooney, True Lease or Lease "Intended as Security"--Treatment
by the Courts, in 1C P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J. McDONNELL, SE-
1988]
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is not involved in the transaction until after the prospective
lessee selects specific equipment and negotiates the price with
the supplier.25 The lessee, like a purchaser seeking financing,
then contacts potential lessors26 to find the most favorable
terms.21  Once the lessor approves the lessee2 and the parties
finalize the lease agreement, the lessor purchases the
preselected equipment from the supplier and directs delivery to
the lessee.29
In addition to the lessee, supplier, and lessor, other parties
may claim interests in the leased property through independent
transactions with the lessor or lessee.30 These parties usually
fall within one of four categories.31 One third party typically
claiming an interest in leased goods is the holder of a lien cre-
CURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE § 29A.03 [here-
inafter Mooney, Lease].
25. See M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377,
1380-81 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
26. See id. at 1380 (noting customer is essentially inquiring about the
"availability of credit"). The leasing industry consists of four basic categories
of professional lessors. The first group comprises independent leasing compa-
nies that have no direct affiliation with banks or manufacturers and that de-
pend on leasing as a major source of revenue. There are two basic types of
independent leasing companies. The lease finance company purchases equip-
ment for lease to specific clients. These companies typically offer only finance
leases. The second type of independent leasing company, specialized or service
lessors, usually supplies specific kinds of equipment and offers finance or oper-
ating leases.
The second category of lessors includes lease brokers who package lease
transactions for prospective lessees and prospective lessor-investors. The third
category consists of captive leasing companies, the leasing subsidiaries of man-
ufacturers or dealers created as a marketing device for a parent company's
products. The fourth category consists of banks and other financial institu-
tions that use leasing as an alternative means of customer financing. See R.
CONTiNO, supra note 1, at 21-26; OUTLOOK, supra note 1, at 53-1 to 53-2.
27. See R. CONTINO, supra note 1, at 19.
28. The bank, or other potential lessor, will assess "the credit-worthiness
of the lessee before accepting the lease." M & M Leasing, 563 F.2d at 1380. "If
it is determined that a prospective lessee is not financially strong enough to
support a particular lease financing, some form of credit support will be neces-
sary." R. CONTINO, supra note 1, at 53. Credit support generally takes the
form of a "full and unconditional guarantee of all the lease obligations from a
creditworthy entity." Id. (emphasis in original).
29. See Mooney, Lease, supra note 24, § 29A.03.
30. See infra Part II.
31. The lessee may expose the lessor's interest to third-party claims other
than those in the four categories. Other third-party claimants may include the
state, owners of real property to which leased goods are affixed, and bank-
ruptcy trustees. In some states, for example, statutes may authorize seizure of
property used in illegal activity. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.703 (West
Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. 18B-504 (1983); see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
[Vol. 73:208
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ated by law.32 For example, a lessee may take leased equip-
ment to a service center for repair and fail to pay the charges.33
The repairer has a lien on the equipment and typically holds
the equipment until the debt is paid.34 A second category of
third-party claimants consists of general creditors of the lessor
or lessee who acquire liens on leased property through the judi-
cial process by judgment, execution, or attachment.35 Secured
creditors of either party compose a third category of claim-
ants.36 For example, a lessor who borrows all or part of the
purchase price of equipment may give the lender a security in-
terest in the equipment.37 In the alternative, the lessor may
either sell the lease and the residual interest in the equipment
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-90 (1974) (holding lessor's innocence no
defense where state seized leased vessel used to transport illegal drugs).
If leased property is affixed to real property, special recording statutes or
other real property laws may bear on the lessor's rights. See Western Mach.
Co. v. Graetz, 42 Cal. App. 2d 296, 299, 108 P.2d 711, 713 (1940). Western Ma-
chinery involved leased mining machinery that would become part of realty.
Because the court found the transaction to be a true lease, it determined that
the statute requiring the recording of mining equipment sales did not apply.
Id. Because the machinery was affixed to land, however, it was subject to real
property recording statutes. The court therefore held that the lessor's title
was subject to the lien of the mortgagee made in good faith and without con-
structive or actual notice of the lease. Id at 300, 108 P.2d at 713. See also Reis-
man & Mooney, supra note 2, at 40 (recording notice may be condition
precedent to lessor's superior rights).
If the lessee undergoes bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code determines the
lessor's rights. Under a reorganization plan, a lease may -be affirmed or re-
jected. Until that decision is made, the debtor-in-possession or the trustee may
be able to use the equipment for the benefit of the estate. Rejection of the
lease constitutes abandonment of the property to the lessor. In a liquidating
bankruptcy, the lessor generally can regain the equipment. The leasehold in-
terest, however, may be assigned to a third party without the lessor's consent
if the estate will benefit. See Reisman & Mooney, supra note 2, at 184-85 for a
detailed discussion of the effect of bankruptcy on the lessor's rights.
32. Examples of common-law and statutory liens include artisan's liens,
materialman's liens, and mechanic's liens. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 832,
104, 881, 885 (5th ed. 1979).
33. See, e.g., Gibreal Auto Sales, Inc. v. Missouri Valley Mach. Co., 186
Neb. 763, 767, 186 N.W.2d 719, 722 (1971) (repairs made on credit of lessee).
34. Id. at 766, 186 N.W.2d at 721-22 (artisan with valid lien "has a right to
retain the [equipment] until the charges are paid").
35. See, e.g., United Rental Equip. Co. v. Potts Callahan Contracting Co.,
231 Md. 552, 554, 191 A.2d 570, 571 (1963) (leased equipment sold in satisfaction
of judgment lien held by creditor of lessee).
36. See, e.g., Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Atlantic Mobile Corp., 252 Md. 286,
287-88, 250 A.2d 246, 247 (1969) (creditor of lessee took leased equipment as
part of collateral for loan and filed financing statement).
37. See, e.g., In re Leasing Consultants, Inc., 486 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir.
1973) (bank financed purchase of equipment to be leased and took security in-
terest in property leased as collateral); see also Reisman & Mooney, supra note
1988]
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or use it as collateral to acquire funds for additional lease trans-
actions.38 Transferees who purchase or lease the equipment
from either the lessor or lessee constitute a fourth category of
third-party claimants.39 For example, a lessee who no longer
needs the equipment may sublease it for all or part of the lease
term.40
II. COMMON-LAW RESOLUTION OF COMPETING
CLAIMS TO LEASED GOODS
Disputes may result over the priority of conflicting inter-
ests in the property when a lessor or lessee enters into separate
transactions with these third parties.41 In seeking to resolve
such priority disputes, courts have found no guidance in the
lease agreement and few answers in the U.C.C. or in other stat-
utes. As a contract, the lease agreement governs issues be-
tween the lessor and lessee,4 but cannot address the competing
claims of third parties. Before Article 2A was proposed, the
2, at 34 ("lessor may leverage its equity by borrowing... a substantial portion
of the cost of the equipment").
38. See, e.g., Reisman, Assignment of Equipment Leases by Sale or as Col-
lateral, in EQUIPmENT LEASING-LEERAGED LEASING 883, 885 (B. Fritch & A.
Reisman 2d ed. 1980) ("manufacturers and vendors convert their long-term
equipment [leases] into a source of operating cash through chattel paper fi-
nancing"). A lease transferred by the lessor to a lender as collateral for a loan
or in a sale constitutes chattel paper, U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b), and is governed by
Article 9.
39. See, e.g., Shosid v. Hughes Tool Co., 258 S.W.2d 945, 946-47 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1953) (scrap dealer purchased leased metal bits from lessees); DeSilvio v.
Restauire, 264 Pa. Super. 528, 530-31, 400 A.2d 211, 212 (1979) (lessee sold
leased car to third party through used car dealer).
40. See, e.g., R. CONTINo, supra note 1, at 120 ("lessee with the right to
sublease equipment is in the best position to lessen or eliminate the impact of
having to pay rent on assets which become unproductive because of changes in
use needs during the lease term"). Unauthorized transfer of equipment is gen-
erally an event of default. Id- at 113. Thus, there is potential for competing
claims.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 30-40.
42. The agreement usually includes specific provisions regarding title and
location of equipment, use, assignment, and subleasing designed to protect the
lessor's ownership interests. See, e.g., EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEAS-
ING 1110-43 apps. (B. Fritch & A. Reisman 2d ed. 1980) (examples of lease
agreements).
The lessee also can take steps to protect rights of use and possession. For
example, the lessee could include a provision in the agreement requiring that
all assignments of the lease be subject to the terms of the lease, thus protect-
ing the lessee's right to continued use of the equipment. The lessee also might
include a provision allowing the lessee to approve potential purchasers of the
lease and equipment or a provision defining acceptable purchasers. See R.
CONTINO, supra note 1, at 97, 119-20.
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U.C.C. had few provisions directly applicable to true leases. 4 3
In rare instances courts analogized to other Code provisions to
resolve priority disputes.M4 In the absence of statutory solu-
tions, courts generally have relied on the common-law principle
of derivative title45 to resolve disputes arising when third par-
43. See Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the U.C.C.-
Part 5: Consignments and Equipment Leases, 77 COM. L.J. 108, 113 (1972)
[hereinafter Hawkland, Amendments] ("[Tirue leases are mainly outside the
scope of the Code."); Hawkland, Impact, supra note 15, at 446 ("[Flew U.C.C.
rules were made specifically applicable to leasing.").
Although true leases are outside the scope of the U.C.C., certain aspects
may be controlled by the Code. Subsection 9-206(1), for instance, governs
agreements by the lessee not to assert available defenses against an assignee,
"whether or not the lease is intended as security." U.C.C. § 9-206 comment 1.
Although Article 9 of the U.C.C. requires the filing of a financing statement to
protect a security interest in collateral, U.C.C. § 9-302, there is no filing re-
quirement for a true lease. Section 9-408, however, authorizes precautionary
filing. Such filing is not determinative of a true lease. "If the lease is a true
lease, none of the provisions of the Article is applicable .... ." U.C.C. § 9-408
comment 2.
Although the transaction creating a true lease is not within the scope of
Article 9, prior or subsequent transactions involving the leasehold interest
may come under Article 9. Article 9 provides that the right to rental pay-
ments for leased goods not evidenced by a writing creates an "account," U.C.C.
§ 9-106; a lease related to specific goods transferred by the lessor to a lender as
collateral for a loan or in a sale constitutes "chattel paper," U.C.C. § 9-
105(1)(b) and comment 4; and goods held for lease may be "inventory," U.C.C.
§ 9-109(4). Transactions intended to create a security interest in accounts,
chattel paper, or inventory associated with the lease and sale of accounts or
chattel paper are subject to Article 9. U.C.C. § 9-102(1). Such transactions are
not within the scope of this Note.
44. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Smithloff, 119 Ga. App. 284,
290-92, 167 S.E.2d 190, 197-98 (1969). In dicta, the court in Smithioff indicated
that under some circumstances U.C.C. § 9-307(1) might protect the lessee as a
"buyer in the ordinary course" against the creditor with a prior security inter-
est. Id. at 290-91, 167 S.E.2d at 197. The court found § 9-307 inapplicable, how-
ever, because a state certificate of title statute made prior recording of a
security interest essential to validity of the interest against a transferee of the
debtor. Id. at 291-92, 167 S.E.2d at 197-98. Reisman and Mooney suggest that
the prior lerfected secured party would have priority over the lessee's posses-
sory rights unless the lessee qualified as a "buyer in the ordinary course of
business" and U.C.C. § 9-307 applied by analogy to leases. Reisman & Mooney,
supra note 2, at 63-64. Under U.C.C. § 9-307(1), a buyer in the ordinary course
of business takes free of a seller's security interest even if it has been per-
fected. Under § 9-307(2) a buyer of consumer goods for personal use takes free
of a seller's security interest unless a financing statement has been filed. See
also Reisman & Mooney, supra note 2, at 38-41 (discussing statutes and com-
mon law applicable to leases).
45. See DeKoven, supra note 7, § 29B.03(2)(b) ("On common law theory,
the lessor, since he has not parted with title, is entitled to full protection
against the lessee's creditors and.., even against good faith purchasers from
the lessee." (quoting G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
§ 3.6, at 76 (1965))).
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ties claim a superior interest in equipment that is subject to a
true lease. Derivative title limits a person's ability to transfer
or encumber property to the interest which that person pos-
sesses.46 This principle affords the lessor or lessee under a true
lease significant protection against third-party claims to the
leased goods.47
Under common law, courts have held that the lessor's
claim of ownership in equipment covered by a true lease is su-
perior to a common-law or statutory lien4" arising out of work
performed at the lessee's request.49 Applying the principle of
derivative title, the lessee has no power to encumber the les-
sor's interest without the lessor's authorization.5 0 Courts have
found one exception to this rule. The lien is effective against
the lessor if the lienholder can show the lessor's express or im-
plied consent to the work performed at the lessee's request. 51
46. See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 193-94 (3d ed. 1975);
8 C.J.S. Bailment § 95 (1988) ("bailee cannot transfer a greater right or a bet-
ter title than he himself possesses").
47. See DeKoven, supra note 7, § 29B.03 (discussing priorities of liens,
claims, and encumbrances upon lessee's default in true lease); see also infra
text accompanying notes 48-58.
48. Typically, a common-law or statutory lien is a claim against personal
property for payment of charges arising out of services or materials provided
by the lienholder related to that property. A valid lien gives the lienholder
the right to retain the property until charges are paid. See, e.g., Gibreal Auto
Sales, Inc. v. Missouri Valley Mach. Co., 186 Neb. 763, 766, 186 N.W.2d 719, 721-
22 (1971) (indicating that valid lien would give mechanic right to retain vehi-
cle). For examples of liens created by law, see supra note 32.
49. See, e.g., Gibreal Auto Sales, 186 Neb. at 767-69, 186 N.W.2d at 722-23
(statutory artisan lien for repairs made to leased tractor at lessee's request in-
effective against owner).
If, however, the statute provides that the lien will attach if work is per-
formed at the request of the lawful possessor, as opposed to at the request or
by the authority of the owner, the statutory lien may allow the lienholder to
assert the lien against the owner. The lease makes the lessee the lawful pos-
sessor. Cf Ross v. Spaniol, 122 Or. 424, 429-31, 251 P. 900, 902-03 (dictum),
affd on rehearing, 122 Or. 443, 259 P. 430 (1927) (stating lease might have cre-
ated lawful possession for bailee-repairer).
In contrast, the holder of a lien created by law has priority over a secured
creditor unless the lien is a statutory lien that expressly provides otherwise.
U.C.C. § 9-310.
50. In Disch v. Raven Transfer and Storage Co., 17 Wash. App. 73, 561
P.2d 1097 (1977), the court articulated the general common-law rule that a
Warehouseman's lien is not effective if the bailor (lessee) merely had legal pos-
session of the goods. "In the absence of a statute to the contrary, one who
deals with a bailee concerning the bailed property does so at his peril. The
bailor, as the general owner of the property, may assert his title as against
third parties." Id. at 78, 561 P.2d at 1100 (quoting 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 39
(1962)).
51. See Joy Oil Co. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 319 Mich. 277, 282-83, 29
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Courts also have enforced a lessor's or lessee's leasehold
rights against creditors of the other party, including creditors
who acquire a lien by judicial process.52 The lessor, for exam-
ple, would have priority over the lessee's creditors to the pro-
ceeds from a judicial sale of leased equipment.53 Based on the
concept of derivative title, a secured creditor of either party is
entitled only to the interest held by that party at the time the
security interest attached. Under a true lease, the interest ac-
quired by the lessee's creditor is limited to the lessee's posses-
sory interest during the term of the lease.M Additionally, the
N.W.2d 691, 693 (1947) (where garage-keeper was unable to prove consent of
owner, he had not established statutory lien); Disch, 17 Wash. App. at 75, 561
P.2d at 1098 (warehouseman not entitled to lien for storage of goods without
knowledge or consent of lessor).
Courts have found that a lease contract requiring the lessee to provide full
maintenance does not reach the level of consent necessary to make the lien
enforceable against the true owner. See, e.g., Gibreal Auto Sales, 186 Neb. at
767-69, 186 N.W.2d at 722-23 (court did not construe maintenance provision as
constituting implied consent by lessor).
Many leases, particularly net leases, require the lessee to maintain the
leased property. Reisman and Mooney recommend that lessors specify that
such obligation does not constitute authority to create a mechanic's lien. See
Reisman & Mooney, supra note 2, at 30.
52. A judicial lien is a claim against property of the debtor obtained by a
general creditor through judicial proceedings against the debtor. Liens ob-
tained through judicial process include attachment, levy, execution, and gar-
nishment liens. See D. EPSTEIN & T. MARTIN, BASIC UNIFORM COMM]ERCIAL
CODE 173-75 (2d ed. 1983).
53. See, e.g., United Rental Equip. Co. v. Potts & Callahan Contracting
Co., 231 Md. 552, 556-59, 191 A.2d 570, 572-73 (1963) (whether lessor's interest
in property sold at judicial sale took priority over lien creditor or purchaser at
judicial sale turned on whether agreement was true lease). In United Rental,
the court found the lease agreement to be a security interest that required fil-
ing in order to protect the "lessor" from the judgment creditor. Id. at 558, 191
A.2d at 573.
Consistent with the concept of derivative title, the common law also pro-
tects the lessee against judgment creditors of the lessor. The creditor acquires
an interest only to the extent of the debtor's interest. Where the debtor previ-
ously has transferred a possessory interest to the lessee in a lease agreement
the possessory interest is severed from the ownership interest and does not be-
long to the debtor. 8 C.J.S. Bailment § 29 (1988) (bailee's right to possession
"is paramount to any right of the bailor... or his creditors").
54. See Taylor Rental Corp. v. Ted Godwin Leasing, 209 Mont. 124, 136,
681 P.2d 691, 697 (1984) (whether secured creditor of lessee could take posses-
sion of cement hopper turned on whether the lease on the hopper was a true
lease or a disguised security interest). In Taylor Rental, a foreclosing creditor
agreed to make the monthly rent payments if the lessor would allow him to
retain possession of a cement hopper to enhance the attractiveness of the busi-
ness being foreclosed. Id at 129, 681 P.2d at 694. When the creditor defaulted
on the payments, the lessor repossessed. Id. at 129-30, 681 P.2d at 694.
Although the court remanded the case for determination of whether the lease
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lessor generally need not give public notice of an interest in
personal property under a true lease5 5 and has no duty to notify
the creditors of record56 of the interest in the property.57 Thus,
was a true lease or a disguised security interest, the court upheld the rental
award. Id. at 138-39, 681 P.2d at 698-99. If the lease was found to be a true
lease, the lessor was entitled to rental payments based on the creditor assum-
ing the debtor's leasehold rights and obligations. If the lease was found to be a
disguised security interest, the purported lessor was entitled to rent based on
an oral contract made by the foreclosing creditor. Id.
The common law provides similar protection to the lessee against secured
creditors of the lessor who acquire security interests subsequent to the lease
agreement. See First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Smithloff, 119 Ga. App. 284,
290-91, 167 S.E.2d 190, 197 (1969) (if lessee acquired his interest before creation
of bank's security interest, his interest would receive priority). The principle
of derivative title limits the interest acquired by the lessor's creditor to the in-
terest that the lessor held at the time the security interest was granted. Thus,
if the lessor previously transferred the right of possession and use to the
lessee, the lessor's creditor would not have a good claim to this interest. If the
creditor has a prior security interest in the property being leased, however, the
lessee may lose possession to the creditor if the lessor defaults. See id. at 291-
92, 167 S.E.2d at 197-98 (suggesting that if bank had perfected its security in-
terest by complying with statute prior to lease agreement becoming enforcea-
ble, bank's interest would have superseded lessee's).
55. See Huddleson, Old Wine in New Bottles: U.C.C. Article 2A-Leases, 5
J. EQUIPMENT LEASE FIN. 15, 22 (1987); see also United Rental, 231 Md. at 557-
58, 191 A.2d at 573 (noting Pennsylvania amendment to U.C.C. eliminating
bailment lease recording requirement).
The federal recording requirements for railroad rolling stock and aircraft,
as well as state motor vehicle title statutes, are exceptions to this general rule.
In addition, some states, such as Florida and South Carolina, have bailment re-
cording statutes. See Reisman & Mooney, supra note 2, at 41; Mooney, supra
note 2, at 1613 nA3 (noting that South Carolina requires public recording of
personal property leases).
56. A creditor of record is one who previously filed a financing statement
perfecting a security interest in the same collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b).
In Taylor Rental, the lessee's creditor had a perfected security interest ex-
pressly covering after-acquired property and the rental inventory used in the
lessee's business. This security interest applied to the "leased" cement hopper
even though the creditor had not financed the "leasing" of that piece of rental
inventory. If the "lease" of the cement hopper had been a disguised security
interest, the priority question would have been governed by Article 9. Under
§ 9-312(3), the creditor (purported lessor), in addition to perfecting his security
interest, would have had to notify any other secured party who had filed ear-
lier for the same type of inventory (the creditor of record) in order to protect
his purchase money security interest. If the "lease" had been a true lease,
however, the lessor would have had priority without filing or notifying a se-
cured party with a perfected security interest in the same inventory. See Tay-
lor Rental, 209 Mont. at 131, 681 P.2d at 695 (leases not intended as security are
not subject to U.C.C. priority rules).
57. See, e.g., Towe Farms, Inc. v. Central Iowa Prod. Credit Ass'n, 528 F.
Supp. 500, 506 (S.D. Iowa 1981). In Towe Farms, the lessors were not estopped
from alleging conversion of cattle that had been leased to a farmer and subse-
quently sold to satisfy the farmer's creditors even though the lessors had legal
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under the common law, the secured creditor has no means to
protect his interest against the lessor's claim.
As a general rule, courts have held that a lessor may re-
cover property from any person who purchases the property
from the lessee or who otherwise receives the property in
transfer from the lessee.58 This right includes recovery from a
buyer who purchases from the lessee in good faith and without
notice of the lessor's ownership.59 Notwithstanding the buyer's
good faith, derivative title provides that the lessee has no own-
ership interest to transfer to the buyer. Similarly, derivative ti-
tle also protects the lessee's leasehold interest against a
subsequent lessee of, or purchaser from, the lessor.60
Two exceptions to the rule of derivative title apply in each
of these third-party situations. Courts have estopped a lessor
from asserting her title against a bona fide purchaser 6' if the
lessor had knowledge of or consented to the sale of the leased
notice of the creditors' security interest in after-acquired property. The court
found that the lessors had no duty to notify creditors of their interest in prop-
erty being leased. Id at 506-07.
58. See, ag., McDonald's Chevrolet, Inc. v. Johnson, 176 Ind. App. 399,
400-01, 376 N.E.2d 106, 107-08 (1978) (affirming lessor's ownership of mobile
home against purchaser from lessee); DeSilvio v. Restauire, 264 Pa. Super. 528,
530, 400 A.2d 211, 212 (1979) (upholding lessor's title to automobile against
party purchasing from lessee).
59. See, e.g., McDonald's Chevrolet, 176 Ind. App. at 404, 376 N.E.2d at 109-
10 (because lessee did not have ownership, purchaser's "status as a good faith
purchaser for value is not determinative"); Shosid v. Hughes Tool Co., 258
S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (holding lessor could recover property
from purchaser who had no knowledge of lessor's interest because "the bailee
had no title to convey,-even to an innocent purchaser"); see also R. BROWN,
supra note 46, at 193 (given dilemma of choosing between owner and innocent
purchaser, common law preferred owner). But see Uniroyal, Inc. v. Ken
Brown Leasing Corp., 36 Mich. App. 599, 604, 194 N.W.2d 8, 11 (1971) (pur-
chaser of vehicle with leased tires prevailed over lessor-owner of tires when
purchaser had no notice tires were leased). Uniroyal is distinguishable on the
grounds that the purchase was subject to a certificate of title statute requiring
recording of liens. Id at 601, 194 N.W.2d at 9. In addition, the court, in a pre-
vious case, had held that a car without tires and an engine was not an automo-
bile and noted in Uniroyal that ownership of tires passes at the moment title
passes. Id at 602, 194 N.W.2d at 10. Under these circumstances, the purchaser
had no indication that someone other than the lessee had title to the tires.
60. See, e.g., MacArthur v. Gendron, 312 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Mo. Ct. App.
1958) (per curiam) (bailee has "right of exclusive possession of the property,
even against the bailor"). If the lessor interferes with the lessee's right to pos-
session, the lessee may recover the property or damages. See R. BROWN, supra
note 46, at 300.
61. A bona fide purchaser is "[o]ne who has purchased property for value
without any notice of any defects in the title of the seller." BLACK's LAW Dic-
TIONARY 161 (5th ed. 1979).
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goods6 2 or if the lessor's conduct led the purchaser to believe
that title was in the lessee.63 Merely conveying possession to
the lessee, however, is insufficient to preclude the lessor from
asserting ownership against an innocent party purchasing goods
from the lessee. 64
The U.C.C. also has been used to diminish some of the les-
sor's traditional protection.65 Courts have applied the entrust-
ment doctrine of section 2-403 to further the interests of
innocent purchasers. 66 The doctrine of entrustment dictates
that if a lessor delivers goods to a lessee who is a merchant
dealing in goods of that kind, the lessee has the power to trans-
fer title to a buyer in the ordinary course of business.6 7 Unlike
62. See, e.g., Keystone Pipe & Supply Co. v. Zweifel, 127 Tex. 392, 397, 94
S.W.2d 412, 414-15 (1936) (lessor expressly approved transaction with third
party); Scruggs v. Crockett Auto. Co., 41 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931)
(bailor knew automobile was on sales floor generally exposed for sale).
63. See Shosid, 258 S.W.2d at 947-48 (finding no conduct on part of owner-
lessor to support estoppel); R. BROWN, supra note 46, at 202-04.
A purchaser asserting estoppel bears the burden of proving reliance upon
the owner's express or implied representation that the bailee had authority to
convey ownership. See Tom W. Carpenter Equip. Co. v. General Elec. Credit
Corp., 417 F.2d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 1969) ("The essential elements of estoppel
must be pleaded and proved."); R. BROWN, supra note 46, at 202 (estoppel has
two elements: representations by owner that he knew or should have known
would be relied on, and actual good-faith reliance).
64. See Carpenter Equip., 417 F.2d at 990 ("mere possession does not cre-
ate an indicia of ownership"); R. BROWN, supra note 46, at 202-03 (under com-
mon law, purchaser "could not rely on the mere possession of his vendor as
indicating title and right to sell").
65. See, e.g., Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. TLW Computer Indus., Inc., 37 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1052, 1057-58 (D.C. Mass. 1983) (applying U.C.C. § 2-
403, court stated that broker, as lessee under true lease, could transfer good
title to leased computer if purchaser was buyer in ordinary course of business,
but found that purchaser was not buyer in ordinary course of business).
66. The Code limits the class of protected purchasers to buyers "in the or-
dinary course of business." U.C.C. § 2-403(2). The buyer in the ordinary
course of business is a person who buys: (a) in good faith; (b) without know-
ingly violating a third party's ownership rights; (c) in the ordinary course;
(d) from a merchant dealing in goods of that kind. U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
67. "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in
goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a
buyer in the ordinary course of business." U.C.C. § 2-403(2); see, e.g., Sumner
v. Fel-Air, Inc., 680 P.2d 1109, 1113 (Alaska 1984). In Sumner, the purchaser of
an airplane brought an action against the dealer, who was lessee of the plane.
The purchaser claimed breach of warranty of title but did not assert owner-
ship against the lessor. Id at 1111, 1112. In dicta, the court indicated that the
purchaser could have defeated any attempt by the original owner-lessor to
regain possession of the airplane because he had purchased from a lessee who
was a dealer in the goods without knowledge of the true owner's interest. Id
at 1113 (referring to U.C.C. § 2-403).
Section 2-403 does not protect an innocent buyer who purchases from a
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the common-law estoppel exception, protection of the innocent
purchaser under section 2-403 does not depend on knowledge
by or conduct of the owner.68
III. EFFECT OF ARTICLE 2A ON PRIORITY OF
INTERESTS ARISING UNDER TRUE LEASES
To a great extent, Article 2A incorporates the common-law
approach to resolving conflicting claims. Under Article 2A, the
lessor's and lessee's leasehold interests are, with minor excep-
tions,6 9 protected against third-party claimants. Part 3 of Arti-
cle 2A sets forth rules governing the rights of various parties
asserting claims to equipment subject to a true lease.70 Section
2A-301 codifies the traditional rule that the lease contract is en-
forceable between the parties and against purchasers of the
goods71 and against all creditors of both the lessor and the
lessee.7 2 To further shield interests of the lessor and lessee,
dealer, however, if the dealer acquires possession through the lessee instead of
the lessor-owner. See McDonald's Chevrolet, Inc. v. Johnson, 176 Ind. App.
399, 403, 376 N.E.2d 106, 109 (1978). The McDonald court reasoned that the
lessee had purchased only possession for a period of time. Id at 404, 376
N.E.2d at 109. Applying the principle of derivative title, the court determined
that because the lessee did not have title, he could not convey title to the
dealer. Consequently, the dealer could not convey good title to any party
purchasing from him. Id This result comports with subsection 2-403(2),
which provides that a merchant may transfer only the rights of the person
who has entrusted the goods to the merchant. See also Carpenter Equipment,
417 F.2d at 988 (lessor of construction equipment prevailed over secured credi-
tor who had financed purchase of equipment from dealer who had received
the equipment from lessee for subleasing).
For a discussion of the applicability of U.C.C. § 2-403 and its effect on pri-
orities, see R. BROWN, supra note 46, at 202-06.
68. See Note, Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-403(2): The Authority
of a Bailee to Convey Title, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 241, 244 (1968) [hereinafter
Note, Authority of a Bailee].
69. See infra text accompanying notes 77-80, 91, 129-131, 141-143.
70. Section 2A-301 states the general rule that a lease contract is effective
"against purchasers of the goods, and against creditors of the parties." Sec-
tions 2A-304 through 2A-310 set forth rules for determining the priority of
claims asserted by specific classes of purchasers and creditors.
71. Article 2A applies to leases of goods including fixtures. U.C.C. § 2A-
103(1)(j) (lease pertains to goods); U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(h) (goods includes fix-
tures). In most cases, the lessor with a prior interest in the fixtures will have
priority over the real estate interest if the interest is perfected with a fixture
filing. The fixture filing must conform to the requirements of § 9-402(5).
U.C.C. § 2A-309. Priority issues surrounding goods that become fixtures are
beyond the scope of this Note.
72. U.C.C. § 2A-301. The lease contract is enforceable between the parties
and against creditors and purchasers "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in [Arti-
cle 2A]." Id.
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Article 2A continues the general practice of not requiring that
leases be filed or recorded to be effective or enforceable. 73
Although Part 3 of Article 2A incorporates many common-law
rules protecting the lessor's and lessee's interests74 from com-
peting claims, 75 several provisions create preferences favoring
third-party interests.76 In effect, part 3 creates a system of pri-
orities designed to provide limited protection to certain credi-
tors and transferees of the lessor and lessee.
A. CLAIMS OF STATUTORY OR COMMON-LAW LIENHOLDERS
AGAINST A LESSOR OR LESSEE
Article 2A offers greater protection for the rights of statu-
tory or common-law lienholders than does the common law.7 7
Section 2A-306 gives persons holding possessory liens, which se-
cure payment of materials for or repairs to leased equipment,
preference over the lessor or lessee unless the statute or rule of
law creating the lien provides otherwise.78 The party against
73. See U.C.C. § 2A-301 comment. Filing of true leases is permissive and
does not affect the priorities of the various parties asserting claims to lease-
hold property. Section 9-408, which provides for optional, precautionary filing,
states that such filing is not determinative in characterizing a transaction as a
lease or security agreement. U.C.C. § 9-408. Article 2A is subject to state and
federal statutes, however, including certificate of title statutes. These laws
may include filing or notice requirements for certain leased goods. See, e.g.,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-80 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (requiring recording of leases of
personal property).
Whether the law should require the filing of true leases has been the topic
of much discussion and commentary. See Ayer, Further Thoughts on Lease
and Sale, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 341, 345-46; Boss, Leases and Sales: Ne'er or
Where Shall the Twain Meet?, 1983 ARiz. ST. L.J. 357, 383 [hereinafter Boss,
Leases]; Dworkin, Commercial Law: DeveloTnnents in Leasing, 1985 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 95, 100-03; Mooney, supra note 2, at 1626.
74. For the lessee, the leasehold interest is the right to possess and to use
the equipment according to the terms of the agreement. See Reisman &
Mooney, supra note 2, at 10-11. For the lessor, the leasehold interest repre-
sents the right to rental payments. IHL at 182-83. The lessor also has a rever-
sionary interest in the goods themselves. Id
75. The lease contract is enforceable against purchasers and creditors.
U.C.C. § 2A-301.
76. U.C.C. § 2A-304(2) (subsequent lessee from original lessor); U.C.C.
§ 2A-305 (buyer or sublessee in ordinary course of business from lessee who is
merchant); U.C.C. § 2A-306 (holder of common-law or statutory lien); U.C.C.
§ 2A-307(2)(a) (creditors obtaining lien through judicial process prior to lease
becoming enforceable); U.C.C. § 2A-307(2)(b) (certain secured creditors).
77. For the common-law approach, see supra notes 48-51 and accompany-
ing text.
78. If a person in the ordinary course of his [or her] business fur-
nishes services or materials with respect to goods subject to a lease
contract, a lien upon those goods in the possession of that person
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whom the lien is enforced need not have consented to the work
unless the statute authorizing the lien so requires.79 Either the
lessee or lessor therefore may encumber the leasehold interest
of the other party without express or implied authorization.80
Lessees routinely order repairs of leased equipment and oc-
casionally make major improvements to the equipment.8'
Whenever the lessee cannot or will not pay for the labor or
materials involved, either the lessor or the repairer suffers.82
Of the two, Article 2A gives priority to the repairer's claim,
ending a judicial practice of interpreting statutory liens as re-
quiring consent of the party against whom enforcement is
sought.83 Article 2A's policy of giving preference to a lien cre-
ated by law over interests of the lessor or lessee will facilitate
commerce by enabling repairers and suppliers to conduct busi-
ness with the assurance that an undisclosed interest will not
unexpectedly defeat the customary procedures available to
them to induce payment.84 Either injured party, whether lessor
or lessee, will have a cause of action against the other party for
the amount of the lien.85
given by statute or rule of law for those materials or services takes
priority over any interest of the lessor or lessee under the lease con-
tract or this Article unless the lien is created by statute and the stat-
ute provides otherwise or unless the lien is created by rule of law and
the rule of law provides otherwise.
U.C.C. § 2A-306.
79. If the lien is created by rule of law, consent may be a factor. See
U.C.C. § 2A-306 (lien takes priority "unless the lien is created by rule of law
and the rule of law provides otherwise"). Applicable cases have held that com-
mon law workman liens are not enforceable against a lessor who has not con-
sented to the repair. See, e.g., Gibreal Auto Sales, Inc. v. Missouri Valley
Mach. Co., 186 Neb. 763, 767-68, 186 N.W.2d 719, 722 (1971) (artisan's lien not
effective against lessor who did not consent, even though lease contract re-
quired lessee to provide full maintenance).
80. Section 2A-306 creates a presumption in favor of the lienholder that
can be overcome when express statutory language or rule of law requires
consent.
81. The lease contract itself usually requires that the lessee maintain the
leased property in good repair. See supra note 51.
82. The lessor will either have to pay the outstanding debt as a condition
of repossessing the equipment, or the repairer will lose the cost of labor and
materials.
83. See, e.g., Joy Oil Co. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 319 Mich. 277, 282, 29
N.W.2d 691, 693 (1947) (where repairer had failed to prove that repairs were
made "at the request of or with the consent of" lessor, he did not sustain the
"burden of establishing a statutory garage-keeper's lien").
84. "Mechanics lien statutes provide one of the most effective collection
procedures available to private litigants." Hellmuth, Mechanics Lien Claims
by Lessee's Contractors, 1982 J. Mo. B. 408, 408 (footnote omitted).
85. The injured party could have a cause of action for conversion. Conver-
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B. CLAIMS OF LIEN CREDITORS OF A LESSOR
AGAINST A LESSEE
Under Article 2A, creditors8 6 of the lessor who acquire a
lien 7 on property covered by a lease normally take subject to
the lease contract.88 Such creditors' liens attach only to the les-
sor's interest in the leased goods.8 9 Subsection 2A-307(2)(a),
however, provides an exception for a creditor holding a lien
that attached9° before the lease contract became enforceable.91
sion is a common-law tort action available against a party who, without au-
thorization, deprives an owner of his property interest permanently or for an
indefinite time. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 300 (5th ed. 1979). The injured
party also might have a cause of action for breach of contract, assuming the
contract prohibited encumbering the property. The common law supplements
Article 2A to provide these remedies. See U.C.C. § 1-103.
86. The U.C.C. definition of creditor includes general creditors, secured
creditors, lien creditors, and any representatives of creditors. U.C.C. § 1-
201(12).
87. Article 2A defines a lien as "a charge against or interest in goods to
secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, but the term does
not include a security interest." U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(r). A secured party is not
a creditor with a lien for purposes of Article 2A. See infra notes 97-116 and
accompanying text (discussing the status of claims made by secured parties).
88. U.C.C. § 2A-307(2). With several important exceptions, § 2A-307(2)
provides that a lessee's interest has priority over claims asserted by creditors
of the lessor. Creditors who may assert priority include: (1) statutory or com-
mon-law lienholders, U.C.C. § 2A-306; (2) creditors of lessors in situations in-
volving fraudulent retention of possession, fraudulent transfers, or voidable
preferences, U.C.C. § 2A-308; (3) creditors with liens attaching before the lease
becomes enforceable, U.C.C. § 2A-307(2)(a); and (4) secured creditors who
would have priority under Article 9 over a creditor holding a security interest
perfected by a filing made at the time the lease becomes enforceable, U.C.C.
§ 2A-307(2)(b). See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing statu-
tory or common-law lienholders); infra notes 91, 99-112 and accompanying
text (discussing creditors with liens and secured creditors).
89. The lessor's interest includes an interest in the lease contract and the
reversionary interest in equipment covered by the lease.
90. A court must look outside Article 2A to determine whether and when
a lien attached. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 550.37 (1986) (listing categories of
property not liable to attachment, garnishment, or execution sale); see also in-
fra notes 93-95 (giving examples of state statutes defining when lien attaches).
91. A creditor of a lessor takes subject to the lease contract, "unless the
creditor holds a lien that attached to the goods before the lease contract be-
came enforceable." U.C.C. § 2A-307(2)(a).
This rule and other priority rules set forth in Article 2A depend on when
the lease contract becomes enforceable. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-304(2) ("before
the interest of the subsequent lessee became enforceable"); U.C.C. § 2A-
307(2)(a) ("before the lease contract became enforceable"); U.C.C. § 2A-
307(2)(b) ("at the time the lease contract became enforceable"); U.C.C. § 2A-
307(4) ("after the lease contract becomes enforceable"). Article 2A does not,
however, explicitly define when a lease becomes enforceable. Part 2 of Article
2A sets out the rules regarding the formation and construction of the lease
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A creditor qualifying for this exception takes free of the lease.
This rule protects a creditor who obtains a judicial lien on a
debtor's property against any attempt by the debtor to place the
property beyond the creditor's reach through a leasing arrange-
ment.92 In most instances, a lessee seeking to lease equipment
has notice of the creditor's lien, either because the property is
in the possession of the sheriff9 3 or because the attachment or-
der is on file in the appropriate government office.9 4 Thus,
with minimal investigation, a lessee can discover the third-
contract. In general, Article 2A provides that the lease contract may be made
"in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both par-
ties which recognizes the existence of a lease contract." U.C.C. § 2A-204. To
be enforceable, the lease contract must conform to the principles of construc-
tion and interpretation contained in U.C.C. Article 1. U.C.C. § 2A-103(4). En-
forceability also depends upon the lease contract meeting the requirements of
the Statute of Frauds provision of § 2A-201. U.C.C. § 2A-301 comment. Under
the U.C.C. Statute of Frauds provision, enforcement of a lease contract worth
$1000 or more requires a writing describing the goods and the lease term or, in
the absence of a writing, a substantial beginning of manufacture or procure-
ment of specially manufactured goods by the lessor, an admission of enforce-
ability, or receipt and acceptance by the lessee. U.C.C. § 2A-201. Receipt and
acceptance of payment on a lease is an insufficient substitute for the writing.
U.C.C. § 2A-201 comment. Enforceability is not dependent on filing or record-
ing the lease contract or financing statement. U.C.C. § 2A-301 comment.
Courts therefore have some discretion in determining when a lease be-
came enforceable. Applying general contract principles, a court might deter-
mine that the lease contract became enforceable at the time the contract was
made. Alternatively, a court might determine that a lease contract is enforcea-
ble only when the parties have complied with the requirements of the Statute
of Frauds provision. Assuming a court bases enforceability on compliance with
the Statute of Frauds provision, there still may be a dispute regarding the spe-
cific time a lease contract became enforceable. For example, if enforceability
is based on a party's admission in court, the court might apply contract law to
determine timing. On the other hand, if enforceability is based on the excep-
tion for specially manufactured goods, the court has some discretion in defin-
ing what constitutes "a substantial beginning of their manufacture or
commitments for their procurement." U.C.C. § 2A-201.
Because Article 2A has no rule expressly defining when a lease contract
becomes enforceable, it allows courts some discretion in determining which
party has priority. Further discussion of the issue of enforceability of the lease
contract is beyond the scope of this Note.
92. Once the lien attaches, it supersedes any subsequent lease agreement.
U.C.C. § 2A-307(2)(a).
93. E.g., MInN. STAT. § 570.061 (1986) (providing that "[a]ttachment of per-
sonal property shall be a lien on the interest of the [debtor] in the personal
property from the time of seizure by the sheriff or subjection to the control of
the sheriff").
94. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 550.13 (1986) (providing that when personal prop-
erty cannot be removed immediately, because of bulk or other cause, it is suffi-
cient levy if officer files in appropriate office certified copy of execution);
MINN. STAT. § 270.69(2) (1986) (providing that notice of tax lien must be filed
in office of appropriate county recorder).
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party interest and can avoid loss by not leasing the property un-
til the lien has been discharged or has expired. Occasionally,
however, property may be subject to a nonpossessory lien that
is not publicly recorded.95 In this circumstance, the lessee has
no protection. 96 Subsection 2A-307(2) makes the lessee's inter-
est subordinate to a judicial lien, regardless of whether the
lessee had knowledge or notice of the lien.
C. CLAIMS OF SECURED CREDITORS OF A LESSOR
AGAINST A LESSEE
Although Article 2A generally protects the lessee against
claims of the lessor's secured creditors,97 the Article provides
exceptions when a secured creditor's interest arises before the
lease transaction. The secured creditor's interest may have pri-
ority over the lessee's subsequently obtained leasehold inter-
95. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.110(d) (West 1987) (providing that
service of order on judgment debtor to appear for examination creates lien on
debtor's personal property); see also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMM. BUSI-
NEss LAw SECTION, STATE BAR CAL., REPORT ON PROPOSED CALIFORNIA COM-
MERCIAL CODE DIVISION 10 (ARTICLE 2A) 45 (Dec. 1, 1987) [hereinafter CAL.
REPORT] (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.110(d) as an example of a secret
lien).
96. The lessee has no easy means of discovering the lien and may lose pos-
session of leased equipment to the lien creditor. In these circumstances, how-
ever, the lessee would have a cause of action against the lessor for breach of
warranty. See U.C.C. § 2A-211 (providing that lease contract includes implied
warranty that "no person holds a claim to or interest in the goods that arose
from an act or omission of the lessor... which will interfere with the lessee's
enjoyment of its leasehold interest").
97. U.C.C. § 2A-307(2) ("a creditor of a lessor takes subject to the lease
contract").
Suppliers who offer a leasing option in-house typically sell the lease or use
it and the residual interest in the equipment as collateral in a loan. Consider
the following example. Lessor leases a computer to Lessee on May 1. On May
2, Finance Agency lends Lessor $50,000 and takes a security interest in the
lease contract and the equipment. Finance Agency perfects its security interest
by filing on the same day. Two months later Lessor defaults and Finance
Agency seeks to recover the computer from Lessee.
Under U.C.C. § 2A-307(2)(b), Lessee's interest is superior to that of Fi-
nance Agency because Finance Agency did not file or perfect its interest
before the lease contract became enforceable. The special priority given to a
purchase money secured creditor does not apply. In this example, Finance
Agency knew of the lease transaction involving the collateral and expressly
agreed to be satisfied by the stream of rent payments and residual value of the
equipment in the event the debtor-lessor defaulted on the loan. Because Fi-
nance Agency knew of Lessee's prior leasehold interest in part of the collat-
eral, Finance Agency cannot complain when its interest in the equipment is
subordinate to that of Lessee.
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est.98 To qualify for protection, the secured party must file or
perfect 99 the security interest before the lease contract becomes
enforceable, 10 0 or must hold a purchase money security inter-
est 10 ' that qualifies for special priority under Article 9 of the
U.C.C.12 The lessee can avoid becoming subject to creditors'
98. Section 307(2)(b) provides:
A creditor of a lessor takes subject to the lease contract, unless the
creditor holds a security interest in the goods that under the Article
on Secured Transactions (Article 9) would have priority over any
other security interest in the goods perfected by a filing covering the
goods and made at the time the lease contract became enforceable,
whether or not any other security interest existed.
U.C.C. § 2A-307(2)(b).
Subsection 9-312 sets forth the rules governing priorities among conflict-
ing security interests. Given that a hypothetical secured party (the stand-in
for the lessee) holds a security interest perfected by filing at the time the lease
becomes enforceable, the lessor's secured creditor must have filed or perfected
before that time, U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(b) ("[c]onflicting security interests rank ac-
cording to priority in time of filing or perfection"), or qualify for a purchase
money super priority under § 9-312(3) or (4).
99. "A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all of
the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken. Such steps are
specified in Sections 9-302, 9-304, 9-305 and 9-306." U.C.C. § 9-303(1). Perfec-
tion typically is accomplished when the creditor files a financing statement.
U.C.C. § 9-302.
100. Article 2A is unclear regarding the timing of enforceability. See supra
note 91. The following scenario illustrates exactly when a secured creditor
qualifies for the § 2A-307(2)(b) exception, allowing his security interest to
take free of a lease contract. On February 1, Buyer purchases a tractor from
Seller on credit. Seller retains a security interest in the tractor and files a fi-
nancing statement on February 8 when the tractor is delivered to Buyer. On
March 1, Buyer leases the tractor to Lessee. Three months later, Buyer-Les-
sor defaults and Seller seeks to recover the tractor from Lessee.
Seller's security interest has priority over Lessee's interest because it was
perfected before the lease became enforceable. See U.C.C. § 2A-307(2)(b).
101. A purchase money security interest is one:
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or
part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obli-
gation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use
of collateral if such value is in fact so used.
U.C.C. § 9-107.
102. A purchase money security interest in inventory would have priority
over the lessee's interest if (a) it is
perfected at the time the debtor receives possession . . . and (b) the
purchase money secured party gives notification in writing to the
holder of the conflicting security interest if the holder had filed a fi-
nancing statement covering the same types of inventory (i) before the
date of the filing made by the purchase money secured party, or
(ii) before the beginning of the 21 day period where the purchase
money security interest is temporarily perfected without filing or
possession.
U.C.C. § 9-312(3). A purchase money security interest in collateral other than
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claims by learning whether any previously filed financing state-
ment covers the property to be leased.10 3 If the property is cov-
ered, the lessee can request that the lender subordinate 10 4 its
interest to the lease or the lessee can refuse to complete the
lease transaction.
Even if the secured creditor of the lessor qualifies to take
free of the lease contract, the creditor's interest can be defeated
in two ways.10 5 Article 2A protects the leasehold interest of a
lessee in the ordinary course of business 0 6 against a security in-
terest in leased goods even if the lessee knows of the security
inventory would have priority over the lessee's interest if it were "perfected at
the time the debtor receives possession .. or within ten days thereafter."
U.C.C. § 9-312(4).
Consider the following example. Finance Lessor and Lessee execute a
lease agreement for a compressor on April 1. The same day, Finance Lessor
completes the purchase of the compressor which Lessee had previously se-
lected from Supplier and directs that it be delivered to Lessee. Finance Lessor
withholds payment to Supplier pending certification that the compressor has
been delivered and installed. Pursuant to the agreement, Supplier takes a
purchase money security interest in the compressor that is perfected by filing
on April 15, the day of delivery. Finance Lessor does not pay Supplier, how-
ever, and three months later Supplier seeks to recover the compressor from
Lessee.
Under § 2A-307(2)(b), Supplier's security interest has priority over the
lease contract. Supplier has satisfied the requirements of § 9-312(4) by filing
the purchase money security interest within 10 days of the debtor receiving
possession. Consequently, Supplier would have priority over any conflicting
security interest in the collateral perfected by filing made at the time the lease
became enforceable and, therefore, would have priority over Lessee. Lessee,
in this example, does not qualify for an exception to the rule that the secured
party takes free of the lease contract. See infra notes 105-112 and accompany-
ing text. Lessee can acquire protection against default by Finance Lessor,
however, by obtaining Supplier's agreement to subordinate its interest to that
of Lessee.
103. A properly filed financing statement indicates that a security interest
in the collateral exists. The absence of public notice implies that no prior se-
curity interest exists. See Burns, Uniform Commercial Code, Public Filing
and Personal Property Leases: Questions of Definition and Doctrine, 22
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 425, 428 (1987).
104. The lender might agree to a lower priority interest in the collateral
than that held by the lessee.
105. See U.C.C. § 2A-307(3)-(4).
106. Section 103(1)(o) provides:
"Lessee in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good
faith and without knowledge that the lease to him [or her] is in viola-
tion of the ownership rights or security interest or leasehold interest
of a third party in the goods, leases in ordinary course from a person
in the business of selling or leasing goods of that kind but does not
include a pawnbroker.
U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(o).
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interest.10 7 To invoke protection, the lessee must act with good
faith'0 8 and without knowledge 0 9 that the transfer violated a
third party's ownership rights, security interest, or leasehold in-
terest.1 10 This protection parallels the protection that Article 9
provides to a buyer in the ordinary course of business.'- L Simi-
larly, the leasehold interest of a lessee not in the ordinary
course of business is protected against most discretionary future
advances made by the secured party to the lessor after the lease
contract becomes enforceable."- There is one exception to this
rule. The secured creditor retains priority if the future ad-
vances were made pursuant to a commitment" 3 entered into
without knowledge of the lease and within forty-five days after
the lease became enforceable." 4
Under Article 2A a lender has no assurance that its inter-
est will have priority if the interest has not been perfected
before the lease agreement becomes enforceable. 1 15 Suppose
that a lessor borrowed money from a lender using equipment
covered by a lease as collateral, but failed to disclose the exist-
ence of a lease contract. The lender in this situation would
find, contrary to expectations, that its priority on the equip-
ment is actually subordinate to the lessee's interest under the
107. "A lessee in the ordinary course of business takes the leasehold inter-
est free of a security interest in the goods created by the lessor even though
the security interest is perfected and the lessee knows of its existence." U.C.C.
§ 2A-307(3).
108. "'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19). "'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b).
109. "A person 'knows' or has 'knowledge' of a fact when he has actual
knowledge of it." U.C.C. § 1-201(25).
110. U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(o).
111. See U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
112. The lessee is protected after 45 days, or sooner if the secured creditor
knows of the lease.
A lessee other than a lessee in the ordinary course of business takes
the leasehold interest free of a security interest to the extent that it
secures future advances made after the secured party acquires know-
ledge of the lease or more than 45 days after the lease contract be-
comes enforceable, whichever first occurs, unless the future advances
are made pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge
of the lease and before the expiration of the 45-day period.
U.C.C. § 2A-307(4).
113. Article 2A incorporates the definition of "pursuant to commitment"
set forth in § 9-105(1)(k). U.C.C. § 2A-103(3).
114. See supra note 112.
115. Neither the lessor nor the lessee is required to file or to give other
public notice of the lease contract. U.C.C. § 2A-301 comment.
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lease contract.116
D. CLAIMS OF CREDITORS OF A LESSEE AGAINST A LESSOR
Except to protect holders of possessory liens for materials
or repairs provided on leased equipment," 7 Article 2A gives the
lessor priority over all creditors of the lessee who claim an in-
terest in leased goods." 8  Subsection 2A-307(1) codifies the
traditional common-law rule requiring a lessee's creditor to
take subject to the lease contract." 9 A creditor's lien or secur-
ity interest attaches only to the lessee's interest. 2 0 A creditor
who proceeds against property ostensibly owned by the lessee
therefore acquires only the use of the equipment during the re-
maining lease term.'2 ' Although temporary use of equipment
rarely satisfies the creditor's claim against the lessee, Article
2A provides no means for the creditor to assure that the debtor
116. Because the lender did not file or perfect its security interest prior to
the lease contract becoming enforceable, the lender's interest would not have
priority over a security interest in the goods perfected by filing at the time the
lease did become enforceable. The lender thus does not qualify for the § 2A-
307(2) exception and must take subject to the lease agreement. U.C.C. § 2A-
307(2).
If the lessor defaults, the secured creditor may be entitled to the rental
payments as proceeds. U.C.C. § 9-306 (security interest continues in any iden-
tifiable proceeds unless disposition by debtor was authorized). Suppose, how-
ever, that the lessor has used the lease contract as collateral in a separate
transaction. Assuming that the second lender perfected his interest in the
chattel paper, the first lender may find that he does not have first claim to the
rental proceeds and that the residual value of the collateral at the end of the
lease contract is minimal.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
118. "Except as otherwise provided in Section 2A-306 [governing priority of
liens arising by operation of law], a creditor of a lessee takes subject to the
lease contract." U.C.C. § 2A-307(1).
119. U.C.C. § 2A-307(1). If the lessee functions in the capacity of the lessor,
as in a subleasing contract, this section governs disputes between the sublessor
and creditors of the sublessee. Creditors of the sublessee take subject to the
lease contract between the sublessor and sublessee. See U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(p)
("lessor" includes sublessors). The provisions of § 2A-307(2) govern disputes
between the sublessor's creditors and the sublessee.
120. The lessee's interest includes the interest in the lease contract and the
right of possession and use according to the terms of the lease.
121. Similarly, the purchaser at an execution or disposition sale acquires
only the lessee's interest. Transfer of the lessee's interest to the cieditor or
purchaser would be deemed involuntary. Under § 2A-303 the transferee there-
fore would have to make assurances to the lessor to retain use of the leased
equipment. If the involuntary transfer "materially changes the duty of or ma-
terially increases the burden or risk imposed on the other party," that party
may demand that the transferee "cure or provide adequate assurance" of per-
formance under the contract. U.C.C. § 2A-303(1)(b), (2).
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has ownership and not simply possessory rights in equip-
ment.122 Subsection 2A-307(1) makes no specific reference to
the rights of those creditors who acquired an interest in the
property while it was owned by the present lessee, as in a sale
and leaseback situation. Article 9 of the U.C.C. will govern
such situations. 23
E. CLAIMS OF PURCHASERS OR SUBLESSEES
AGAINST A LESSOR
Subsection 2A-305(1) codifies the common-law rule that a
purchaser or sublessee "takes subject to the existing lease con-
tract."'2 4 This provision incorporates the principle of derivative
title and limits the interest a transferee may acquire. Under
subsection 2A-305(1), the transferee acquires only the leasehold
interest held by the lessee at the time of the transfer.25 Arti-
cle 2A enumerates two limited exceptions to this rule.
First, a lessee with a voidable leasehold interest2 6 can
transfer a good leasehold interest to a good faith transferee for
value.127 Because the transferee takes subject to the lease con-
tract, however, the interest acquired is limited to that provided
122. Article 2A requires neither the lessor nor the lessee to file or to give
other public notice of the lease contract. U.C.C. § 2A-301 comment.
123. Because Article 2A recognizes the validity of sale-leaseback transac-
tions, it would seem that the drafters did not intend that § 2A-307(1) be con-
strued to affect the rights of creditors of the lessee acquired while the lessee
was owner. U.C.C. § 2A-308(3). Section 9-306(2) provides that a security inter-
est continues in collateral notwithstanding disposition unless the lender au-
thorized the disposition. Thus, the rights of a creditor who acquires a security
interest in property that has been sold and subsequently leased back by the
original owner should be governed by Article 9.
124. U.C.C. § 2A-305(1). See supra text accompanying notes 58-62 (discuss-
ing common-law handling of claims asserted by transferees).
125. Unless the lease prohibits voluntary transfers, "a buyer or sublessee
from the lessee of goods under an existing lease contract obtains, to the extent
of the interest transferred, the leasehold interest in the goods that the lessee
had or had power to transfer." U.C.C. § 2A-305(1).
A state's certificate of title statute may, however, supersede this rule of
priority. A transferee of goods subject to a lease contract and covered by a cer-
tificate of title statute "takes no greater rights than those provided both by
this section and by the certificate of title statute." U.C.C. § 2A-305(3).
126. Article 2A does not define a "voidable leasehold interest" but sets
forth three situations in which the rule would apply. When the lessee has ob-
tained possession of equipment through a lease transaction, a good faith pur-
chaser or sublessee acquires a good leasehold interest even though the lessor
was deceived regarding the lessee's identity, the check given on delivery was
dishonored, or delivery was procured by fraud. U.C.C. § 2A-305(1).
127. See U.C.C. § 1-201(44).
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in the original lease. 28
Second, although the general rule of Article 2A protects
the lessor's interest against claims arising out of the lessee's
transactions with third-party purchasers or sublessees, 29 sub-
section 2A-305(2) allows a merchant-lessee to transfer both the
lessor's interest and his own interest in the goods free of the
lease contract. 3 0 This rule draws on the entrustment doctrine
of its U.C.C. Article 2 analogue, subsection 2-403(2) and ad-
vances the general Code policy of facilitating commerce by pro-
tecting consumer expectations in the marketplace. 1 3'
Three elements must be present before subsection 2A-
305(2) applies: the lessor must entrust the goods to the
lessee;132 the lessee must be a merchant dealing in goods of that
128. "A lessee with a voidable leasehold interest has power to transfer a
good leasehold interest to a good faith buyer for value or a good faith sublessee
for value, but only to the extent set forth in the preceding sentence." The pre-
ceding sentence provides that:
Subject to the provisions of Section 2A-303 [covering transfer of lease
contracts, see supra note 121], a buyer or sublessee from the lessee of
goods under an existing lease contract obtains, to the extent of the in-
terest transferred, the leasehold interest in the goods that the lessee
had or had power to transfer, and except as provided in subsection (2)
and Section 2A-511(4), takes subject to the existing lease contract.
U.C.C. § 2A-305(1).
129. U.C.C. § 2A-305.
130. Section 305(2) provides:
A buyer in the ordinary course of business or a sublessee in the
ordinary course of business from a lessee who is a merchant dealing
in goods of that kind to whom the goods were entrusted by the lessor
obtains, to the extent of the interest transferred, all of the lessor's
and lessee's rights to the goods, and takes free of the existing lease
contract.
U.C.C. § 2A-305(2).
131. "The many particular situations in which a buyer in ordinary course
of business from a dealer has been protected against reservation of property or
other hidden interest are gathered ... into a single principle protecting per-
sons who buy in ordinary course out of inventory." U.C.C. § 2-403 comment.
132. It is not clear whether the lessor must be aware that the lessee is a
merchant dealing in the same goods as those leased. This question arises in
the context of entrustment under goods for sale governed by U.C.C. § 2403(2).
See Note, Authority of a Bailee, supra note 68, at 245. There has been some
support for requiring a showing of awareness on the lessor's part. See Atlas
Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 54 Misc. 2d 168, 171, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400, 404
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967). If full weight is to be given to the intent of the provisions,
however, a knowledge element should not be required. The provision intends
to facilitate commerce by protecting innocent buyers. Under this interpreta-
tion, if the lessor intends to deliver goods to the lessee, whether or not the les-
sor was aware of the lessee's status as a merchant dealing in goods of that
kind, the entrustment element is satisfied.
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kind;133 and the buyer or sublessee must acquire the interest in
the ordinary course of business.13 The policy choice that sub-
section 2A-305(2) embodies is a familiar one. In a transaction
133. A buyer is protected only if the lessee-seller is a person in the busi-
ness of selling goods of that kind. See U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(a). A sublessee,
however, is protected if the lessee-sublessor is in the business of selling or leas-
ing goods of that kind. U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(o). Section 2A-305(2) thus would
not protect a buyer in the ordinary course if the buyer purchased from a
merchant who regularly leased but did not sell the goods of the type in ques-
tion. To illustrate: if a lessor leased a fleet of vehicles to a company engaged
in short-term vehicle leasing, the lessor would have priority over the pur-
chaser because the purchaser would not meet the requirements of a buyer in
the ordinary course under § 2A-103(1)(a).
Subsection 2A-305(2) apparently overlaps with § 2-403(2), which protects a
buyer in the ordinary course who purchases goods entrusted to a merchant
who deals in goods of that kind. Entrusting includes leasing. There is a differ-
ence, however, in the definition of buyer in the ordinary course as applied in
Article 2 as opposed to Article 2A. U.C.C. § 2A-305 comment. Article 2A re-
quires that the buyer take without knowledge that the sale violated a lease-
hold interest of a third party.
134. U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(a). The following example illustrates the applica-
tion of § 2A-305(2). Red Brown acquires a small plane for use in his business
under a five-year lease agreement with a "no cancellation" clause. Three
years into the lease, Red's business slows and he subleases the plane to a local
aircraft dealer on a three-month term renewable until business revives. The
dealer includes the plane in its leasing inventory, but instead of reserving it
for short-term leasing as planned, the dealer seizes an opportunity for signifi-
cant profit and leases the plane to White Bros. Transport on a five-year con-
tract. Six months later, Red acquires several large carrier contracts and
notifies the dealer that he will not renew the sublease contract at the end of
the current term and will take possession of the leased plane. White Bros.,
who leased from the dealer, claims that its interest in the leased plane is supe-
rior to Red's.
In this example, Red is the lessor and the dealer is the lessee subleasing
the equipment. Under the general rule of § 2A-305, the sublessee would take
subject to the lease contract between Red and the dealer. U.C.C. § 2A-305(1).
Because the dealer had a three-month lease, the sublessee could acquire no
more than what remained in that term. Assuming that the lease contract did
not prohibit voluntary transfers, see U.C.C. § 2A-303, the sublessee can acquire
only a leasehold interest that the "lessee had or had power to transfer."
U.C.C. § 2A-305(1).
Ordinarily, then, Red could recover the plane after three months. Red,
however, chose to sublease to a merchant dealing in aircraft. Under § 2A-
305(2), Red assumed the risk that a buyer in the ordinary course or a sublessee
in the ordinary course would acquire not only the dealer's rights but also all of
his lease rights to the plane. "[A] lessee who is a merchant dealing in goods of
that kind... [has power to transfer] all of the lessor's and lessee's rights to the
goods." U.C.C. § 2A-305(2). Under these rules, White Bros.'s interest has pri-
ority. Red can protect against this result in the future by refusing to lease to a
merchant dealing in goods of that kind.
If White Bros. is a sublessee in the ordinary course, Red will not be able to
recover the plane until the end of his own original lease term, approximately
one and one-half years later.
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between two innocent parties, the one entrusting to a dealer
bears the risk.135  Because a contrary rule would create
problems in the market,1 36 the buyer or sublessee in the ordi-
nary course of business may rely on the dealer's ostensible
ownership. Subsection 2A-305(2) limits the interest a dealer-
entrustee can transfer solely to his own and the entrustor's in-
terest. 37 A hypothetical situation illustrates this principle.
Suppose a farmer who had leased a tractor subleases it to a
merchant dealing in farm equipment for three of the remaining
five years of his lease term. The merchant has power to sub-
lease the tractor to a sublessee in the ordinary course of busi-
ness for the full five years remaining on the entrustor's lease.
The merchant does not, however, have power to convey the
rights of the owner who originally leased the tractor to the
farmer.138 Thus, as long as the lessor does not lease to a
merchant dealing in goods of the kind leased, the interest the
sublessee or another transferee of the lessee can acquire is sub-
ject to the original lease contract. 139
F. CLAIMS OF A LESSEE AGAINST ANOTHER LESSEE OF THE
SAME LESSOR
Section 2A-304 addresses priority disputes arising between
original and subsequent lessees when a lessor leases equipment
subject to a previous lease. Subsection 2A-304(1) incorporates
the common-law preference for the original lessee's possessory
rights and makes the interest of a subsequent lessee subject to
the prior lease contract. 40
135. See U.C.C. § 2A-305 comment.
136. "[T]he need to expedite sales of inventory by protecting buyers in the
ordinary course of business is a widely felt commercial reality." R. BRoWN,
supra note 46, at 205.
137. Subject to the voidable interest exception, a person has power to en-
trust only his own rights. It is important to keep in mind that "lessor" in-
cludes "sublessor" unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. U.C.C. § 2A-
103(l)(p). Thus, where the original lessee-sublessor delivers the leased goods
to a merchant-lessee, the merchant-lessee can freely transfer any rights in the
property plus any leasehold rights of the sublessor. Based on the concept of
derivative title, however, the merchant-lessee cannot transfer the rights re-
tained by the original lessor. The lessor's ownership interest is protected
against transferees unless the lessor leases to a merchant dealing in goods of
that kind and the transferee qualifies for the buyer or sublessee in the ordi-
nary course of business exception.
138. The original lessor-owner did not entrust the tractor to a merchant
dealing in goods of the kind leased.
139. U.C.C. § 2A-305(1).
140. An exception is made for the buyer or subsequent lessee who takes
[Vol. 73:208
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Subsection 2A-304(2), however, creates a narrow exception
to the general rule that the original lessee has priority. Under
this subsection, a subsequent lessee in the ordinary course of
business1 4 1 takes free of the existing lease contract. To invoke
the exception, the original lessee must have entrusted the
goods to the merchant-lessor before the subsequent lease be-
came enforceable. 142 Suppose that a dealer executed a lease
agreement with A that called for delivery of the equipment to
A in six weeks. Prior to delivery, however, the dealer leases
the same equipment to B. Because A, the original lessee, en-
trusted 4 3 the equipment before the subsequent lease contract
became enforceable, subsection 2A-304(2) would subordinate
A's interest to that of B, the subsequent lessee. To address this
situation, the drafters of Article 2A balanced the interests of
two innocent parties leasing from the same merchant. By con-
ditioning the subsequent lessee's priority on the earlier lessee's
entrustment, the drafters provided additional protection for the
original lessee and supplied a clear rule to resolve competing
claims of the two parties.
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
Even though Part 3 of Article 2A incorporates some
needed protections for innocent purchasers and creditors, addi-
tional protections should be added. At least two amendments
to Article 2A should be made. First, under certain circum-
stances, Article 2A should protect bona-fide lessees who do not
qualify for protection as lessees in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. Second, Article 2A should shift the initial burden of iden-
tifying the existence of a lease affecting certain property from
the goods in good faith for value upon disposition after repossession. U.C.C.
§ 2A-527(4). The lessor can transfer only the remaining interest that the les-
sor has in the goods or the interest that the lessor has "power to transfer."
The following hypothetical illustrates this principle. X, the owner of a tractor,
leased it to A on March 15 for a four-month term. A took possession the same
day. On March 30, X finds he can lease the tractor to B for a three-year term
at a favorable rate if B can take possession immediately. X executes a lease
agreement with B.
Under U.C.C. § 2A-304(1), A's leasehold interest has priority over B's sub-
sequent interest.
141. See supra note 106 (defining lessee in the ordinary course of business).
142. U.C.C. § 2A-304(2) (goods must have been "entrusted by the existing
lessee before the interest of the subsequent lessee became enforceable against
the lessor").
143. The definition of entrustment includes any delivery or acquiescence in
possession. U.C.C. § 2-403(3).
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third parties to lessors. Shifting this burden could be accom-
plished by requiring lessors to file their leasehold interests or
to mark their leased goods in order to provide notice to subse-
quent creditors and transferees. Both amendments would fur-
ther Article 2A's goal of providing extended protection to
innocent creditors, transferees, and similarly situated parties.
Under the first suggested amendment, a good-faith lessee
leasing for value and without notice of a prior judicial lien144
could take free of that lien. The following situation illustrates
the importance of this exception. Pursuant to an examination
order,145 a judgment creditor acquires a lien attaching to equip-
ment owned by the debtor. While that equipment is still in his
possession, the debtor leases it to a lessee. Following the exam-
ination proceedings, the sheriff seizes the equipment and sells
it to satisfy the judgment.146 As currently drafted, subsection
2A-307(2) subordinates the lessee's interest in the leased equip-
ment to the creditor's lien regardless of whether the lessee had
knowledge or notice of the lien attaching. This is a deviation
from the Code's usual policy of not enforcing "hidden" interests
against third-party transferees.-47 Such a worthy policy should
be extended to protect the lessee who leases in good faith, for
value, and without knowledge or notice of competing claims to
the property. Extending this policy to protect the good-faith
lessee would not prevent lien creditors from satisfying any
judgment recovered out of the lessor's interest in the leased
144. Creditors can obtain attachment liens and other judicial liens prior to
judgment. Goods subject to such a lien may remain in the possession of the
debtor. See, e.g., supra note 95.
145. An examination order is a court order requiring a judgment debtor to
appear and answer questions concerning his property to aid in enforcement of
a money judgment. See Collins v. Angell, 72 Cal. 513, 514, 14 P. 135, 135 (1887).
146. Cf Nordstrom v. Corona City Water Co., 155 Cal. 206, 212-13, 100 P.
242, 245 (1909) (stating that when judgment creditor institutes supplemental
proceedings to collect on the debt, any recovery relates back to time of levy
and cuts off intervening claims).
147. See infra note 153. Enforcing a nonpossessory lien of which there is
no public notice also varies from Article 2A's general emphasis on protecting
the interests of the parties to the lease agreement against creditors of the par-
ties. Article 2A creates three exceptions to the general rule that creditors of
the lessor take subject to the lease contract. Exempted are: possessory liens
created by law, liens that attach prior to the lease becoming enforceable, and
perfected security interests. U.C.C. §§ 2A-306-307. In most cases the lessee has
actual or constructive notice of the lien. Typically, either the equipment is in
the possession of the creditor or there is a public filing on record which the
lessee could check to ensure that there are no hidden claims that might take
precedence over the lessee's right of possession. In situations in which a non-
possessory lien is unrecorded, the lessee has no means of protecting himself.
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goods. The creditor could acquire the flow of rents and any
residual interest in the property belonging to the lessor.148
In addition to amending Article 2A to extend protection to
good-faith lessees as suggested above, subsection 2A-307(2) also
should be amended to provide an exception for lessees in the
ordinary course of business.14 9 As currently drafted, Article 2A
gives the claim of a creditor with a nonpossessory judicial lien
priority over the claim of a lessee in the ordinary course of
business who leases from a merchant dealing in goods of the
type leased. The proposed amendment would parallel Article
2A's exception for lessees in the ordinary course of business
against claims of secured creditors. 150 The amendment would
advance the general Code policy of facilitating commerce by
protecting the expectations of innocent purchasers and lessees
in the marketplace.
Article 2A also should be amended to shift the risk of de-
termining whether leased property is encumbered from credi-
tors and purchasers to lessors. This goal could be accomplished
by requiring lessors to file long-term commercial leases.151 Ar-
148. Section 2A-303 governs alienability of leasehold interests. A lessor's
or lessee's leasehold interest can be involuntarily transferred. In the event of
an involuntary transfer, Article 2A requires the transferee to provide assur-
ances to the other party to the lease. U.C.C. § 2A-303(2).
149. See CAL. REPORT, supra note 95, at 45-46 (recommending that Califor-
nia amend its Code of Civil Procedure in response to Article 2A in order to
provide protection for the lessee in the ordinary course of business against
nonpossessory judicial liens).
150. U.C.C. § 2A-307(3) (lessee in ordinary course of business takes free of
security interest created by lessor even if lessee knows of interest).
151. This Note focuses on long-term leasing and its role as an alternative
means of financing the acquisition of needed equipment. See supra notes 9-12
and accompanying text. Commentators have discussed the advantages and dis-
advantages of requiring filing for some categories of true leases and exempting
others. See, e.g., Ayer, supra note 73, at 345-354 (raising concerns regarding
mandatory filing of true leases); Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Os-
tensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL STuD. 53-55 (1983) (arguing that filing system
serves useful function in sorting out and protecting interests of competing
property claimants); Boss, Leases, supra note 73, at 382-86 (arguing that public
policy behind requirement of filing for security interests should apply to leases
as well as sales unless other considerations, such as de minimus leases, make
filing inappropriate); Burns, supra note 103, at 454-62 (arguing that because
use of public files as disclosure tool has diminished, costs of mandatory filing
outweigh benefits); Hawkland, Amendments, supra note 43, at 114-15 (arguing
that filing requirement would prevent innocent creditors and purchasers of
lessee from being misled); Huddleson, supra note 55, at 22-23 (reviewing fac-
tors considered by drafters of Article 2A in determining not to require public
filing); Leary, supra note 7, at 252-53 (suggesting that because practical and
economic distinctions between leasing and secured financing have narrowed, it
would be appropriate to subject most leases to Article 9 rules, including filing).
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ticle 2A currently adopts the policy that the lessor's ownership
interest in equipment possessed by the lessee should have pri-
ority over the interests of third-party claimants even if those
claimants have no easy means of discovering the lessor's inter-
est.1 52 As a practical matter, a creditor, purchaser, or sublessee
cannot simply rely on the ostensible ownership 53 of the lessee.
These parties instead must investigate to determine the extent
of the lessee's interest. Thus, creditors and transferees bear the
burden of determining whether property is subject to an ex-
152. See U.C.C. § 2A-307(1).
153. The principle of requiring public notice of nonpossessory property in-
terests is rooted in the common-law doctrine of ostensible ownership. Under
this doctrine, a creditor or owner who allowed another to possess property
"with the indicia of ownership" was estopped from asserting her "hidden in-
terest" against a third party. See Burns, supra note 103, at 434-36. Burns notes
that historically, nonpossessory ownership interests were upheld against third-
party creditors, purchasers, and trustees in bankruptcy in cases where intent
to deceive was absent. She also notes that certain commercial transactions,
such as true bailments and conditional sales, were exempted from the doctrine
of ostensible ownership. Id Currently, however, a creditor claiming an inter-
est in specific property must have possession or publicly record the interest to
enforce it against third parties, regardless of bona-fide intent. U.C.C. §§ 9-203,
9-301, 9-305.
Because it was important to the growth of commercial financing to en-
force nonpossessory property interests against third parties, the legal system
devised a rule allowing a creditor to give public notice of the interest in lieu of
retaining possession of the debtor's property. See Baird, supra note 151, at 53-
54. The rule allows both debtor and secured creditor to enjoy the benefits aris-
ing from recognition of nonpossessory property interests, without requiring
third parties to bear the entire risk of uncovering undisclosed interests. Baird
argues that a legal system that permits nonpossessory security interests must
"confront the costs that the division of ownership rights imposes on third par-
ties." Id at 57. According to Baird, legislatures could decide that third parties
should not bear any of the cost and could adopt a rule that nonpossessory se-
curity interests are not enforceable against third parties. Such a rule, how-
ever, would impose significant risks on the creditor, resulting in limited
secured credit or exceptionally high interest rates. Second, legislatures could
decide that third parties should bear all of the cost and could make all nonpos-
sessory security interests enforceable against them. In order to minimize risk,
the third party would have to conduct an investigation to determine whether
there was an undisclosed division of ownership interests. Such investigations
could be costly and still fail to provide information about a hidden interest in a
particular piece of equipment. Third, legislatures could spread the cost among
the various parties by mandating some notice requirement. The third party
would still have to conduct an investigation. Because investigation would be
easier and more likely to uncover a division of interests, however, the costs to
a third party would be reduced. See id. at 56-59. Although a mandatory filing
rule imposes a cost on the secured party, and consequently on the debtor, the
U.C.C. assumes that the benefit of not having to take possession outweighs the
cost. Baird & Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the
Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175, 175 (1983).
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isting lease contract. The policy that this rule manifests devi-
ates from the U.C.C.'s principle that a party's nonpossessory
interest in property typically is effective against other parties
only if those parties can discover that interest.1' The same
principle should apply to long-term leases.
As discussed earlier, long-term leasing is essentially an al-
ternative means of commercial financing. 55 Lessors and les-
sees choose leasing over other forms of financing for various
reasons. Although leasing may differ from secured transactions
in its allocation of property rights and obligations between the
parties, the transactions are indistinguishable to a third party.
The lessee has ostensible ownership, while the lessor retains a
nonpossessory property interest. To the extent that the lessor's
or lessee's leasehold interest is enforceable against third par-
ties, creditors or purchasers dealing with either party-bear a
risk of losing to a "hidden" superior claim. A potential creditor
of the lessee seeking security in unencumbered collateral
should be able to obtain assurance that no competing interests
have priority.156 Similarly, a potential lender to the lessor
should be able to discover the existence of a lease contract cov-
ering the collateral the lender intends to take as security.157
The easiest means of achieving this goal is to impose a filing re-
quirement parallel to that which Article 9 imposes on secured
creditors.158 The drafters of Article 2A, however, rejected im-
posing a filing requirement on lessors or lessees that would per-
mit third parties to discover the existence of leasehold claims
on property.15 9 Thus, third parties must rely on other means to
154. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 153, at 178; see also U.C.C. § 9-302
comment (transactions are exempt when suitable alternative means of giving
public notice are available).
155. See supra notes 13-29 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 120-123 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
158. See Burns, supra note 103, at 454 (Article 9 filing is traditional cure to
problem of ostensible ownership).
159. The Committee rejected mandatory U.C.C. filing, determining that
the costs outweighed the benefits. It concluded that the burden of adding ad-
ditional filing requirements to an already overburdened recording system was
not justified by the protection that would be achieved. See Nat'l Conf. of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings in Committee of the Whole,
Personal Property Leasing Act, 158-60 (Aug. 1984) (available on microfiche)
[hereinafter Proceedings] (remarks by Mr. DeKoven). It emphasized that
creditors, the group most likely to be concerned by the lack of public notice,
were not asking for protection. Id at 159.
"Costs" of filing include administrative overhead and filing fees as well as
an increased risk that the lessor will lose inherent priority in the property to a
third-party claimant because of a delay or technical error in filing. Another
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guard against purchasing or lending against leased property.160
The drafters rejected mandatory public filing of leases pri-
marily because they believed the costs of mandatory filing out-
weighed the benefits.161 This position, however, does not
explain why leases, especially long-term leases, should be
treated differently from secured transactions when the two are
functionally similar and frequently indistinguishable to third
"cost" of mandatory filing is the burden it would place on filing and recording
systems currently overburdened with security transactions.
To opponents of filing, these additional costs are not justified by the pro-
tection that would be achieved. Opponents contend that modern credit prac-
tices, such as financial statement analysis, and the use of credit reports and
credit references, have diminished the role of public files in credit financing.
These opponents also argue that creditors, both general and secured, make
credit decisions with the expectation that earnings, rather than particular as-
sets, will be the source of repayment. Consequently, opponents conclude that
because public filing offers little information regarding a debtor's overall fi-
nancial health and profitability, creditors would derive a very limited benefit
from mandatory filing of true leases. Opponents of mandatory filing also ques-
tion whether third-party purchasers would benefit, postulating that few would
actually search the files. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 103, at 429, 457 n.171; Pro-
ceedings, supra note 159, at 158, 161-62.
160. See Burns, supra note 103, at 456-59 (creditors can look to "financial
statement ratio analyses, make inquiry of other creditors, and request infor-
mation from... Dun & Bradstreet"; buyers can seek "external evidence of
title... [and] independently verify the title documentation").
161. See supra note 159. Opponents of mandatory filing may have over-
stated the costs involved. Although lessors would incur additional costs if fil-
ing were required, the lessor presumably would pass these "costs" along to the
lessee in the form of a higher rental rate. Because most lessors engaged in
long-term leasing already file precautionary leasing statements, see U.C.C. § 9-
408 and comment, however, it is likely that some of these costs are included in
lease rates.
In addition, because precautionary filing of long-term leases is common-
place, the burden on recording systems may not increase as dramatically as
feared. Moreover, with computerization, state recording systems will be able
to accommodate heavier demands, and at the same time decrease the turn-
around time for receiving information requested. But see Burns, supra note
103, at 429 n.25.
This Note addresses only long-term leasing that serves as a device for fi-
nancing the acquisition of large equipment and advocates filing of these leases.
It does not consider whether filing should be required for short-term leases or
for leases involving minimal dollar amounts. Exempting short-term and de
minimis leases from the filing requirement would reduce the potential burden
on state filing systems. See ABC's, supra note 12, at § 4.1.05 (discussing Cana-
dian Personal Property Security Act).
Because "[n]either the acquisition and dissemination of information about
competing property claims nor the assumption of the risk of an undiscovered
superior property claim is costless," the burdens should initially fall on the
holder of the property interest "who can handle them most cheaply." Baird &
Jackson, supra note 153, at 188-89.
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parties.162 Unless a more important interest is served by ex-
empting lessors from the general principle that a holder of a
nonpossessory property interest has an effective interest only if
third parties can discover that interest, lessors should be re-
quired to file. Finance lessors, for example, should not have
automatic priority over creditors holding a perfected security
interest in the lessee-debtor's property by virtue of an after-ac-
quired property clause when purchase-money secured credi-
tors163 must file to assure priority over the same creditors.
164
Because the U.C.C. has adopted a notice filing system to sort
out the claims of persons asserting an ownership interest in
property, this system should encompass all transactions that
split the bundle of ownership sticks and create nonpossessory
property interests.16
5
As an alternative to requiring public recording, Article 2A
could require lessors to permanently mark leased property.
Permanent marking, in the form of an engraved or painted la-
bel, would specify the rights of the lessor and would protect
transferees and creditors of the lessee. Those parties might
otherwise be deceived by the lessee's ostensible ownership of
property.166
CONCLUSION
Leasing has become a popular device for financing the ac-
quisition of needed equipment. Leasing differs from secured fi-
nancing because the lessor, the party analogous to the secured
creditor, retains ownership of the leased property. The two
transactions are similar, however, in that they are designed to
162. Leary, supra note 7, at 252 (finding "continual narrowing of the practi-
cal and economic distinctions between leasing and secured financing, where
leasing is for use for a substantial term").
163. Finance lessors and purchase money secured creditors perform a simi-
lar function. Both finance the acquisition of equipment needed by the lessee
or purchaser respectively. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
164. To assure priority over conflicting security interests in the same col-
lateral, such as that which lessors enjoy over security interests of the lessee's
creditors, the purchase money secured creditor must file within the prescribed
time and comply with any applicable notice requirements. U.C.C. § 9-312(3),
(4).
165. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 153, at 187-89 (arguing that such a
rule would enhance the advantages of a system of secured credit).
166. Such labeling is commonly seen on rental trailers and railroad cars.
In Shosid v. Hughes Tool Co., 258 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), the raised
trademark of the Hughes Tool Company was relied on to identify leased roller
bits as property of Hughes entitled to priority over a subsequent purchaser
from the lessee. Id- at 947.
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allow both parties to the transaction to have rights in the equip-
ment. This situation creates the potential for conflicting claims
to the property when either party or both parties engage in sep-
arate transactions with third parties involving the equipment.
In resolving disputes between parties claiming an interest
in property covered by a true lease, courts generally have ap-
plied the common-law principle of derivative title and have pro-
tected the lessor's or lessee's interest against claims arising out
of actions of the opposite party. Absent estoppel or statutory
exceptions, courts have enforced the lessor's ownership rights
against all creditors or transferees of the lessee. Similarly,
courts generally have protected the lessee's leasehold interest
from claims arising out of activities of the lessor undertaken af-
ter the lease transaction. Until Article 2A was proposed, how-
ever, there was no comprehensive, uniform framework for
addressing the legal issues related to leasing.
This Note discussed several provisions in part 3 of Article
2A that set forth rules ordering the priorities of various parties
asserting claims to leased personal property. In its present
form, Article 2A conforms for the most part to existing law.
Article 2A has departed from traditional common law, how-
ever, in its attempts to provide protection to certain creditors
and transferees of the lessor and lessee and thus to bring the
law of personal property leasing into line with policies reflected
in other articles of the U.C.C.. Although Part 3 of Article 2A
extends some needed protection to purchasers and creditors,
additional protections are worthy of consideration.
This Note suggested two amendments to Part 3 of Article
2A. Article 2A should create an exception to subsection 2A-
307(2) allowing a good-faith lessee who leases for value and
without notice of a prior nonpossessory judicial lien to take free
of that lien. A second amendment should require public re-
cording of long-term leases. As presently drafted, Article 2A
provides no easy means for creditors, purchasers, or sublessees
to discover a lessor's interest in property ostensibly owned by
the lessee. A mandatory filing requirement for long-term
leases is consistent with the general U.C.C. principle that a
holder of a nonpossessory property interest must make it possi-
ble for others to discover that interest if the interest is to be ef-
fective against third parties. Finally, mandatory filing advances
Article 2A's policy of protecting the legitimate interests of third
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parties engaged in independent transactions with the lessor or
lessee.
Linda L. Boss

